Steering Clear of Conflict Zones

For those of us who have flown beyond the European boundaries, particularly towards Central Africa and the Middle East, yet another challenge has arisen: Conflict Zones. Bringing along various new threats such as GNSS interference, overflight restrictions, special procedures and various hostile threats such as surface-to-air weapons, understanding the risks associated with hostile areas has never been more crucial. In this feature, we aim to generate awareness for the conflict zone risk assessment process and take a look into how Israel manages its airspace during conflict.

In the world of aviation, perhaps one of the most unpredictable and hazardous situations is flying near or through conflict zones – regions where armed conflict is either imminent or already taking place. With 59 state-involved armed conflicts recorded in 2023, the highest number recorded since 1946 according to Uppsala University, it is clear that steering through conflict zones has become a growing part of our work. Though efficient routings are important, safety should always have the highest priority, particularly in regions where surface-to-air attacks are a legitimate concern. The tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, Iran Air Flight 655 overhead the Persian Gulf, Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 on departure from Tehran, or the DHL Airbus A300 in Baghdad, remain prominent reminders of how vulnerable civilian aircraft can be in hostile airspace. Between 1985 and 2020, there were 57 incidents involving surface-to-air weapons targeting civilian planes, most of which occurred in conflict zones and could have been avoided by restricting the area for overflights.

While civilian pilots are trained to handle high pressure situations and to mitigate risk, we are not trained in evaluating the risks associated with surface-to-air threats or in handling their encounter inflight or on ground. Furthermore, civilian aircraft are usually not equipped with defensive mechanisms, making them highly susceptible to Surface-To-Air-Missiles (SAMs), Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) and small arms fire. MANPADs have statistically been the most common weapon system used against civil aviation, but the smaller size of their warheads means they are less likely to be as catastrophic as a SAM strike, which almost always results in the total loss of aircraft, passenger and crew. The limited weapons envelope and lesser sophistication of MANPADs further decrease their effectiveness against civilian airliners flying at higher altitudes outside of their reach. Regardless the type of weapon system used, when non-state actors control these weapons, the risks are increased, because they often lack formal military training and access to information on civilian air traffic movements. The likelihood of misidentification, as seen with MH17, only increases in these scenarios, making it crucial to avoid airspace where SAMs are present. Where states (such as it is the case within Israel) are being targeted, homing failures of air-defense systems, target confusion or debris from successful interceptions pose a further risk to airliners and can be the cause of casualties on board, emergencies and aircraft damage.

Because SAMs pose the biggest and most common risk to civil aviation within conflict zones, they are the major topic of discussion and ICAO legislation. Nonetheless there are further risks associated with operating in conflict zones, that go beyond the use of weapons. Air-to-air threats, airspace congestion due to restrictions, on-ground security concerns or psychological strains for flight crews, which can negatively influence flight safety and leave long lasting impact, are only some of them.

Managing the Risks: National and International Efforts

Assessing the risks associated with conflict zones presents a significant challenge for regulators, airlines and flight crews alike. An effective risk assessment relies on sophisticated information and must be conducted by specialists with deep expertise. Regulators are typically the best informed, as they have access to restricted information and work within expert-driven groups. Airlines have security departments, that rely on information from regulators, open-source intelligence platforms like Osprey Aviation, and collaboration with partners. For flight crews, our primary duty is to ensure the safe conduct of flights, not to analyze conflict areas. However, to facilitate safe operations and make informed decisions when confronted with issues arising from these high-risk environments, it is essential that we stay informed. To build trust in our knowledge base, it helps to understand the risk-assessment process and the information that feeds it.

According to ICAO Annex 17, it is the responsibility of each state to monitor threats to civil aviation within its borders and to and prevent unlawful interference. However, as the downing of MH17 demonstrated, states do not always fulfill this responsibility, often due to political or national interests. In the case of MH17, the airspace over eastern Ukraine was legally open to civilian aircraft despite active military operations. The result was the misidentification of the aircraft as a threat by the SAM operators, leading to its downing.

Because nations fail to follow their responsibilities, more responsibility is being put on foreign states to monitor conflict zones and restrict their use in case of security concerns. In Germany, for instance, the Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport (BMDV) is responsible for evaluating the risks to civilian aircraft in conflict zones. This responsibility is delegated to the German Civil Aviation Authority (LBA), which conducts risk assessments and recommends safety measures. If necessary, the BMDV has the legal power to restrict overflights of certain areas to aircraft registered in Germany. This power is derived from the German Air Traffic Act. The measures undertaken by the BMDV are communicated via NOTAMs (Notices to Airmen) or transferred to longer-term Air Information Circulars (AICs). Currently, German authorities have imposed restrictions for flights over Sudan, Syria, Yemen and Ukraine, emphasizing the importance of thorough national risk assessment.

However, while they could restrict their own airspace, some governments do not possess the legal power to enforce overflight restrictions in foreign airspace. Switzerland, Spain and the Netherlands are examples of such countries. Here the risk-assessment of an airline becomes even more important. ICAO Annex 6 obliges operators in any case to perform a risk assessment and implement mitigation measures when intending to operate over or near conflict zones. Depending on cooperation between governments, agencies and operators, the quality of such a risk-assessment can strongly vary in quality and extent. As analyzed by the Dutch Safety Board in their accident investigation of MH17, the operator only referred to NOTAMs and did not perform an additional, independent risk assessment - an unfortunate example of insufficient risk evaluation. To promote common practices and high standards for risk assessment between operators, the IATA Geopolitical Risk Taskforce (GRTF) has published guidance which extends upon existing IATA standards and recommendations and emphasizes practical techniques for threat identification, assessment, and risk management. Further guidance also can be found in the ICAO DOC10084 which serves as a risk assessment manual for conflict zones.

In general, larger airlines tend to have well-informed, well-equipped, and highly capable security departments. Smaller operators, on the other hand, often lack the resources and access to information that larger carriers possess, leading them to mimic the decisions of their larger counterparts or to not perform a sufficient risk assessment. However, limited resources do not absolve these smaller operators of their responsibility to conduct thorough, independent risk assessments. Additionally, where management personnel hold key postholder positions, conflicts between security priorities and economic interests are more likely to arise.

While governmental agencies typically have superior intelligence on potential threats - such as detailed information on weapons systems and their deployment - airline operators are better at integrating this information. Their knowledge of their own operations enables them to identify and implement appropriate mitigation strategies. For instance, an operator conducting overflights in a conflict zone will require different protective measures compared to one planning to land or take off in the same area, even though they face same threats.

On a European Level, the risk assessment is being performed by the European Commission through the Integrated EU Aviation Safety Risk Assessment Group. The working group produces Information Notes and Conflict Zone Information Bulletins (CZIBs). The CZIBs are being made available by EASA on their website and on an airline and member state targeted information sharing platform. Even though the European Union plays an active role in risk assessment, its powers are limited to offering guidance as it has no legal power to restrict the use of airspaces for member states. Meaning, on a European level, providing recommendations is the sharpest weapon.

Still, despite all these measures, it lies in the nature of conflict zones that information is often limited, restricted, unclear, or subject to national interests. The highly dynamic developments within conflict zones further increase the risk of misinformation. In the end, pilots tend to be left with an incomplete picture of the threats they face, as NOTAMs and other briefings only provide a superficial understanding of the risks involved. If we are not well informed – we cannot make the right decisions. While we are trained to handle a variety of airborne risks, flying over or near conflict zones adds layers of unpredictability that can quickly become catastrophic. The presence of SAMs and the psychological stress of flying in such conditions makes these areas extremely dangerous for civilian aircraft, their passengers and flight crews. For these reasons, VC believes that flights into conflict zones can never be operated with the same level of safety as 'regular' flights and strongly advises against flying into or near conflict zones whenever possible.

Safety, after all, should always be the priority.